Is pleasure or pain analyzable?

Re: Aquinas Hobor’s post 103749 of 5/29/25

While it is true that sadists and masochists exist, the physical mechanism that registers pain or pleasure still functions, regardless of their psychological evaluation of these experiences. They may have a psychology oriented in a way to (try to) enjoy these sensations, but those sensations still register the same physiologically. In other words, the pain from a hot stove still hurts the same whether you “like” it or not.

In addition, sadomasochism is a phenomenon studied far up the conceptual hierarchy beyond even the science of ethics. Now, there are ethical implications to these types of sexuality, though the study of how they manifest and why belong to the science of psychology.

So, even with these divergent psychological desires, the case still holds that the physical mechanism registering either pain or pleasure still hurts or pleases.

/sb

Re: Aquinas Hobor’s post 103772 of 5/30/25

If I understood your original post correctly, the proposed axiom is trying to bridge sensation (pleasure and pain) and evaluation (pleases and hurts). Actually it’s even stronger: it’s saying that the two must be linked: they cannot even be evaluated separately. I understand the motivation, and I think in many contexts it must be true, but doubt that it’s universal.

In fairness, the axiom I have proposed isn’t trying to bridge evaluation with sensation; the axiom “pleasure pleases and pain hurts” only indicates the physical mechanism. Yes, one may come to like pain or dislike pleasure, but the evaluation of these sensations occur much later. The pleasure or pain is what it is, physiologically speaking.

Now, are there pains or discomforts that one may enjoy? Yes. Working out in the gym comes with pain or discomfort, though, over time, one can come to enjoy the strain exercise brings to the body. But this enjoyment is something that one learns to enjoy, as the pain, over time, is accompanied by a healthier, more resilient, and more attractive body. But one doesn’t learn pleasure or pain as such. That option isn’t open to anyone. Even performing operations altering one’s nervous system to augment sensations aren’t changed by learning.

The purpose of this axiom is to designate the basis for any action, not to bridge psychological evaluations with their accompanying sensations.

To complicate matters further, people’s reactions to sensations can be context-dependent: a slap might be negative in ordinary contexts, but positive in sexual ones. Moreover, even if in some contexts an individual might register a slap as pleasing, I severely doubt that the same individual would like to have his arm chopped off with an axe in any context.

Yes, people’s reactions are context-dependent, but the physical sensation isn’t. People may come to enjoy some more painful elements of the sexual act, but those elements are still painful. The “hurt” involved in the sensation still occurs physically. That’s what the axiom is getting at.

Re: Aquinas Hobor’s post 103798 of 5/31/25

Some minor pains may be intriguing or tantalizing, as when one purposely seeks out pain, it’s a way of testing one’s limits. Learning about these limits is interesting. But even with this interest, it still holds that the pain still hurts; they are motivated to seek pain to discover certain bodily limits.

This actually reminds me of something Harry said in the post Where Mises went wrong:

Continued happiness while doing the same old things forever is impossible. Consciousness is a difference-detector: old sources of enjoyment pale; new achievement is necessary just to keep “content.” Life is growth, and happiness itself requires setting new goals and new challenges.

In a sense, experiencing pain is itself a challenge, up to a certain point. By proving to yourself you are capable of certain degrees of pain, whether that involves eating habanero peppers or reaching a new maximum lift in the gym, you can build more confidence in yourself to push further the next time. With each new pain threshold breached, that serves as a way of creating a new “source of enjoyment.”

Now, I don’t think it’s healthy to constantly pursue pain as an end in itself. However, occasionally, meeting the limits of your pain tolerance is still physiologically painful, though psychologically tantalizing.

Re: Jose Donis’ post 103775 of 5/30/25

So, for my friend, relief (pleasure) means sitting in a manner that is detrimental to his posture and pain is sitting in a manner that will, in the long run, fix his backache.

What your friend should have done is continue the physical therapy. Yes, there is discomfort in physical therapy, initially. Though, over time, as one improves their posture, they enable better mobility and overall quality of life. A rational person would recognize the discomfort but continue pushing, within limits, to have a stronger, more resilient back.

While slouching may feel more comfortable, practicing better posture improves their overall quality of life, and a rational man would recognize that and continue the practice (within reasonable limits).

Re: Kyle Ratliff’s post 54758 of 5/29/25

I agree that all living organisms do not experience pain or pleasure. When writing my initial thoughts, I was more focused on the second criteria (an axiom constituting the base of all knowledge), and hastily took for granted the first. I think a more accurate designation for the subset of living organisms that experience pain or pleasure is ‘living beings that are both conscious and capable of locomotion’—though I think this proposed standard could be further refined.

With that being said, I tentatively disagree with the following statement:

Pleasure and pain may or may not be axiomatic concepts for ethics, I don’t think it matters.

Wouldn’t stating the base of all ethical knowledge be worthwhile? A pillar within Objectivist ethics is “life as the standard of value.” But what is the standard of life, particularly a man’s life? I think identifying and justifying the standard of what makes a man’s life possible and worth living in explicit terms is worth proving. And what better way of doing that then reducing all values down to the perceptual level?

In other words, abstract arguments advancing the ethics of altruism over egoism can be (rationally or otherwise) denied; perceptual level concretes that found the axiomatic basis of ethical theories can’t.

Now, even if an altruist agrees that “pleasure pleases and pain hurts”, they would claim that other’s people’s pleasure are the purpose of a man’s life over his own. Though, at the very least, altruists acknowledging that pleasure is the source of values puts a significant chink in their armor, rather than adopting some rationalistic ethical principle. Demanding all ethicists answer the perceptual basis of any values at all would lead said theorists to adopt a more reality-oriented approach. And with rationalism out for lunch, an evidence based ethical framework can flourish, i.e., Objectivism.

I still think more investigation on this issue is warranted before declaring pleasure and pain as axiomatic ethical concepts. Though, I wanted to get more of my thoughts posted here. I’ll likely have more to say on this topic in the future.